Abstract:
Introduction:
Standard economic theory, from its very inception, assumes that all economic participants are self-interested. This standard assumption, although is meaningful in many circumstances might not be true always. People are not always motivated by self-gain maximization; instead we often do care about others and react in fair, altruistic ways. Unfair distributions of wealth or consumption, relatively unequal payment structures do make us worried. From Guth, Schmittberger & Schwarze (1982) and their famous experiment on 'ultimatum game' to recent social experiments by Camerer (2003) , various experimental evidences have proved the existence of other-regarding preferences in behavioural decision making 1 . In fact relaxing the self-regarding hypothesis is crucial for contract theory since the aim is to design appropriate incentives, and therefore people's attitude towards other's wellbeing as well as his own wellbeing is crucial for incentive design. However, so far not much work has been done to see how classical contract-theoretic predictions change in the presence of other-regarding preferences. We in this paper try to analyze how participants interact in presence of interdependent (other-regarding) preferences and how the conclusions obtained deviate from the standard case of self-interested participants.
Specifically we focus on the case where there is hidden action and an other-regarding principal interacts with first a self regarding agent and then an other-regarding agent. The agent is income constrained implying that a limited liability constraint operates. We characterize the optimal contracts under various parametric cases and compare it with the standard self-regarding scenario. We see, first in the case of self-regarding agent, that the optimal contract differs considerably when the principal is inequity averse. Also the agent is generally (weakly) better-off under an 'inequity averse' principal compared to a 'status seeking' principal. Then we consider the case where an other-regarding principal interacts with an other-regarding agent. We characterize the optimal contracts and compare our results with Itoh (2004) . In Itoh (2004) the principal was self regarding and there existed a unique optimal contract. Whereas, in our paper the principal is other regarding and we show that the same unique optimal contract exists for a 'status seeking' principal and this doesn't necessarily hold for an inequity-averse principal. We also show that a status seeking principal is worse-off the more other regarding the agent is. An inequity-averse principal is also worse-off given that an additional condition holds. When the principal is behind and therefore always inequity-averse, she would always prefer a status seeking agent. This entire analysis is carried out in a single principal-agent framework; multiple agent case is kept for future research.
Examples of other-regarding principal can be an employer who is benevolent and cares about the welfare and income distribution of the employee vis-a-vis his own. Other examples can be the concept of 'welfare capitalism' where in some capitalist economies (mainly in Europe) there was (and still is) a practice of businesses providing welfare services to their employees. There are also examples of employee's welfare cooperatives in
Europe that took care of employee welfare in different dimensions 2 .
Quite a few recent papers have dealt with the matter of incorporating other regarding (or social) preferences into contract theory 3 . One of the earlier papers that talked about other regarding preferences and moral hazard is the paper by Itoh (2004) . The paper focused mainly on the interaction between a self-regarding principal and an other-regarding agent and showed that the principal is in general worse-off the more other-regarding the agent is.
Although Itoh (2004) briefly mention other-regarding principal, he doesn't analyze the other-regarding principal self-interested agent case in detail, and this paper attempts to fill that gap and show that interesting non-trivial outcomes occur in such a structure. Englmaier and Wambach (2010) 4 address optimal incentive contracts with inequity-averse agents and
show that the optimal structure of the contracts does get altered. But they don't focus on other-regarding principal. Dur and Glazer (2008) use a principal-agent model to study profit-maximizing contracts when a worker envies his employer. They show that envy tightens the worker's participation constraint and calls for higher pay and/or a softer effort requirement. This paper is also an example where the agent is other-regarding whereas the principal is self-regarding whereas we focus exclusively on the case where the principal is other regarding 5 .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we examine the benchmark self-interested principal-agent case. In section 3 we analyze the interaction between otherregarding principal and self-regarding agent. In section 4 we analyze the case where both 3 For a survey on this topic see Englmaier (2005) . 4 They focus on continuum of outcomes whereas we focus on discrete outcomes. 5 Other papers like Englmaier and Leider (2008) incorporate reciprocal preferences into a moral hazard framework and derive properties of the optimal contract and implications for organizational structure. Also Hart and Moore (1998) incorporate social preferences into a contracting problem but that was done in an incomplete contracting framework.
the principal and the agent are other-regarding. Section 5 provides concluding remarks and throws some light on future works.
The self-interested benchmark:
We briefly analyze how players react in a standard principal-agent framework where both parties are assumed to be self-interested in nature. We assume both the principal and agent to be risk-neutral. The participation constraint will not bind at the optimum and the agent gets a rent equal
. With this preamble we go over to our analysis of other-regarding principal and self regarding agent. 8 This implies that the set of feasible contracts are given by
The implication is that at the optimum the participation constraint will not bind. One can extend the analysis to 0 > u without changing the qualitative aspect of the paper much. 10 In fact there is a continuum of first best contracts.
Other regarding principal and self regarding agent:
From various experimental evidences, starting from the ultimatum game, it has been shown that the principal is not always motivated by self-interest (see Forsythe et al., 1994) . The principal might act other-regarding either because she is fair-minded, or she anticipates that otherwise, the unequal distribution of payoff might hurt the agent and thus he might retaliate and hurt the principal. Or, put simply, a principal can be benevolent and therefore might care about the wellbeing of the agent vis-à-vis his own payoff. As already mentioned in the introduction, the concepts of 'welfare capitalism' and the 'employee's welfare cooperatives' in Europe stand testimony to the existence of other-regardingness in employer's preferences. In this section, we will focus on the problem of a single otherregarding principal interacting with a self-interested agent. We will try and characterize the optimal contracts in this framework. The major departure of this model from the benchmark one is that the utility function of the principal is not only a function of her own material payoff but also of the agent's material payoff 11 . We work with a modified version of a piecewise linear utility function due to Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Neilson and Stowe (2003) . The function captures a broader class of other-regarding preferences viz. 'inequityaversion' and 'status-seeking' as will be explained shortly. All the other basic assumptions are kept same as the benchmark case. Following Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Neilson and Stowe (2003) we can write the utility function of the principal as 11 For more on other regarding preferences and different approaches see Itoh (2004) .
The first part of the principal's utility function corresponds to the case where principal's net payoff (when the project succeeds) exceeds that of the agent's i.e. , the principal's utility is decreasing in the difference in payoffs between the principal and the agent and therefore the principal is said to be 'inequity averse', even if he is ahead. When the principal is behind then he is always 'inequity averse'. Along with this we make the standard assumptions that
. The objective of the principal is to maximize her own expected utility, subject to the agent participating in the project and putting in high effort. Now, as before, even here the implicit assumption we make is that the principal wants to implement high effort over low 14 .
12 Itoh (2004) also works with the same function. Here we take the agents payoff to be his wage. One can alternatively specify agent's payoff net of his effort cost, i.e. d w − and it is straightforward to extend our analysis in this direction. 13 This terminology is due to Neilson and Stowe (2003) . 14 Which implies that the following condition holds: ) ( ) 2 ( and the principal will always be ahead at the optimum. Therefore, given binding limited
, the problem of the principal in this case can be formulated as:
is the unique optimal contract if the principal is status-seeking in
will be the unique optimal contract if the principal is inequity-averse
Proof:
(a). The expected benefit to the principal when high effort is implemented is
and it is unique. Therefore ) 0 ,
is the unique optimal contract if the principal is status-seeking. The agent gets a positive net expected payoff equal to 
Proposition 2:
The agent is (weakly) better-off under an inequity-averse principal than a status seeking principal.
Proof:
. Therefore, the result. QED Case 2:
This is the case where the principal is certainly behind the agent when the project succeeds.
Again, for the tractability of solution, we assume that b is sufficiently high such that it is optimal for the principal to offer a contract and elicit high effort from the agent. The principal is always inequity-averse when he is behind. Similar to the previous case, at the optimum, the limited liability will bind and therefore given that the principal wants to elicit high effort the principal's problem becomes
Incentive compatibility constraint which is less than P d ∆ / and since he is inequity averse it is optimum for the principal to
and ensure that the agent accepts the contract 16 . Therefore,
will be the unique optimal contract. One final case we consider is
. It seems obvious that the optimal wage offer then would
Alternative Specification:
We have so far assumed that the principal compares his income where the agent might put in low effort. All other assumptions of the previous section are kept intact.
Is it still optimum for the principal to offer zero wage in case of failure? To understand that note the subtle difference of this case with the earlier one. If the principal offers zero wage in case of failure the agent's net payoff now is d − whereas the principal's payoff is zero. Therefore the principal is always ahead when the project fails assuming that he pays zero in case of failure. Now a status seeking principal will enjoy this inequity and therefore he will optimally pay 0 0 = w . But a sufficiently inequity averse principal might not like this and therefore might optimally offer a positive wage in case of failure to minimize inequity and consequently offer a even higher 1 w so that the incentive compatibility is satisfied.
Therefore whether or not limited liability binds will be conditional and the following lemma states a sufficient condition for limited liability to bind at the optimum:
Lemma 1: The principal will optimally offer
Proof:
To fix ideas suppose the principal is ahead if the project succeeds. Now, given 1 w the principal will choose that 0 w that will maximize his expected payoff ( )
.The principal can therefore optimally reduce 1 w such that the incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied.
Again if the principal is behind if the project succeeds then the principal is inequity averse in case of success. Therefore the expected payoff function of the principal will be ( ) 
subject to the participation constraint and the incentive compatibility constraint. Since by assumption 2 we know that 1 (.) ' 2 < f πρ holds then the unique optimal solution will be ) 0 , / (
, the wage offer 1 w′ ′ can't be anything less than p d ∆ / to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint. Since, principal is always behind in this case, again the unique optimal wage offer will be ) 0 ,
. Therefore we get
Proposition 3:
If the effort cost is considered, given assumption 2,
is the unique optimal contract irrespective of whether the principal is status-seeking or inequity averse.
But if assumption 2 doesn't hold the principal will optimally offer a positive 0 w such that the inequity from being ahead is minimized. Therefore if the optimal failure wage is set at 2 / 0 d w = ′ ′ then the resultant utility loss from inequity when the project fails goes to zero.
Again we can consider the two previous sub-cases. If ( )
and given that 1 (.) ' 2 > f πρ holds the optimal success wage is set at
and one can check that the incentive compatibility is satisfied if
then the only contract that satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint
Claim 2:
will be the unique optimal contract. The limited liability will not bind in this case. Otherwise
is optimal and the limited liability will bind at the optimum.
Both Other Regarding Principal and Agent:
We now examine the situation where both the principal and the agent are other regarding and both the principal and the agent cares about each other's material payoffs. The principal's other regarding utility function is given by (1) as in section 3. The primitives of the agent's possible effort choices and the associated costs and other assumptions remain the same as in the benchmark model (i.e. section 2). In addition to this, following Itoh (2004), we assume that the agent also has the following utility structure: Once again to simplify our analysis we start with the assumption that 0 0 = ′ ′ w . Later we will show that at the optimum the limited liability will indeed bind. Now given the current specification the agent doesn't suffer from inequity when the project fails, following Itoh (2004) , the incentive compatibility constraint of the agent can be written as follows: Step 2: Now to show the uniqueness of ( ) The other possibility is a contract ( ) Step 3: Now, given 2 / 1 b w < and we will follow Itoh (2004) to complete the proof.
Since ( ) 0 1 , w w satisfies the incentive compatibility constraint we get
Combining (4) and (3) we get (6) 
holds then our previous result will follow 19 .
For the rest of our analysis we assume that both
and we maintain this as an assumption. To explain the above proposition, note that the agent is always behind and therefore is inequity averse in this situation. So the greater the α , more wage will have to be paid to the agent to make up for the agent's welfare loss due to inequity. Now a status seeking principal will hate this increased wage payment and therefore will be unambiguously worse-off the more other -regarding the agent. On the contrary a, inequity-averse principal might like this increased wage payment since this will lead to reduced inequity and if the positive in-equity effect dominates the negative wage effect then the inequity-averse principal will be better-off dealing with a more other-regarding agent. Put differently the inequity-averse principal will not prefer a more other fair-minded agent if the negative wage effect dominates the positive in-equity effect. The condition 1 ) ( 2 < ′ z f πρ ensures that the negative wage effect dominates the positive in-equity effect. to satisfy already behind inequity averse principal more. On the contrary the principal will benefit from a more status-seeking agent. Since in this case the principal is behind the agent and the agent being status seeking enjoys being ahead. Now if the agent becomes more status seeking the principal can optimally reduce his payment and still get to elicit high effort from the agent. Put differently now it is possible for the principal to implement high effort from the agent at a lower cost. This in turn makes the principal less-behind and therefore the inequity-averse principal will benefit from a more status seeking agent.
Conclusion:
This paper analyzes optimal contracts when an other-regarding principal interacts separately with a self-regarding and other-regarding agent that hitherto has been left untouched in the literature. We showed that when an other-regarding principal interacts with a self-regarding agent the optimal contract differs considerably when the principal is 'inequity averse' compared to the self-regarding case. Put differently when the principal is status seeking we get back the self regarding result whereas when the principal is inequity averse the optimal success wage is considerably higher than the self regarding case. Then we considered the case of an other-regarding principal interacting with an other-regarding agent and we show that the a unique optimal contract similar to Itoh (2004) exists but if the principle is status seeking, otherwise not. We also show that a status seeking principal is worse-off the more other regarding the agent is. An inequity-averse principal can also worse-off under certain parametric configurations. Finally when the principal is behind and therefore always inequity-averse, she would always prefer a status seeking agent. One limitation of our paper is that we in this paper consider a single principal agent interaction whereas one can conceive of a situation where an other-regarding principal is interacting with more than one
